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Introduction
In conjunction with the release of the book titled Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto by Stewart and Wiener (2003) , Duke University organized the International Conference on Reconstructing Climate Policy: Moving Beyond the Kyoto Impasse, 11-12 May 2003. The organizer invited me to give an lead speech, specifically asking me to address the following two issues:
• Whether is the proposal for joint accession by the U.S. and China in the interest of China?
• Even if participating a global cap-and-trade regime is so beneficial to China as many economic studies suggest, why has China consistently refused in international negotiations even to discuss its participation in it?
In this paper, we will look at the first issue from the following perspectives: a) how does what are the implications of "lock in" to emissions cap, in particular no rules and principles for setting emissions targets for the commitment periods subsequent to Kyoto?; e) how to address the complex undertaking of setting emissions caps for developing countries, which must be linked to future, unobserved levels in comparison with the historically observed levels for industrialized countries?. Finally, the paper touches on the likely path forward.
Joint accession by the U.S. and China
For quite some time, the U.S. and China have pointed at the other as the culprit who is blocking the climate negotiation process. This leads to a dilemma. On the one hand, the U.S. rejects the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts major developing countries like China, Mexico and India, and thus it is conceivable that the U.S. would not re-join the international climate regime without more specific commitments than those general commitments from major developing countries. On the other hand, the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol leaves plenty of excess hot air of zero costs (Löschel and Zhang, 2002 ). This will substantially reduce incentives to invest in clean development mechanism (CDM) projects that imply reduced financial flows channelled to developing countries through CDM. Given that China is widely regarded as the dominant host country of the CDM projects (Zhang, 2000a and 2004) , the significant decrease in demand for permits as a result of the world's largest single buyer remaining outside the international market of tradable permits would lower the gain of China substantially.
Against this background, some American analysts (e.g., Stewart and Wiener, 2003) suggest joint accession by the U.S. and China. This proposal does have the merit of enhancing environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol and helping stabilize the price of permits on the international market. It is certainly in the interest of the U.S.
because the participation of China would substantially reduce the U.S. compliance costs and increase the environmental effectiveness. The question then is whether the joint accession proposal is in the interest of China. I doubt the prospects for China's interest in the joint accession proposal for the following reasons.
First, although broad discussions and cooperation in the field of climate change continue between China and the U.S., it is doubtful that China would be willing to discuss joint cap-and-trade arrangements with the U.S. For historical reasons, China attributes great importance to maintaining unity of the Group of 77 (G77), and engaging in discussions on joint cap-and-trade arrangements with the U.S. may well be perceived as threatening the solidarity of that Group. Developing countries, including China, insist that industrialised countries should demonstrate taking the lead in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions before developing countries even consider taking on such commitments.
With the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and a very low scale of overall emissions reductions in the industrialised countries during the first commitment period (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) 
COP Decision China's position Issue
Refrain from using nuclear power to generate CERs Second, the legitimacy of the U.S. insistence that it will re-join the Kyoto Protocol or a follow-up regime only if major developing countries join as well is questionable. Given that the U.S. is the world's largest economy and emitter of greenhouse gases, it has both the responsibility for the global climate problem and the ability to contribute to solving it.
To have a significant long-term effect on global greenhouse gas emissions, a global climate regime eventually must include substantial participation by developing countries.
But the U.S. conditioning its commitments on developing countries' commitments is unlikely to induce participation by developing countries. In my view, unless the U.S. has made credible commitments itself, it does not have the moral right to persuade developing countries to take meaningful abatement actions. International climate negotiations prior to the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol suggest that U.S. taking on the commitments first and then jawboning developing countries including China had some impact on the position of developing countries and the timing of their commitments (Zhang, 2000b) . 2 2 Prior to Kyoto, developing counties' demand for the U.S. to demonstrate the leadership and the EU proposal for a 15% cut in emissions of a basket of three greenhouse gases below 1990 levels by 2010 put collective pressure on the U.S., which leads the world in greenhouse gas emissions. At Kyoto, the U.S. had made legally binding commitments. The Kyoto target is seen as not enough but yet not unreasonable given that the U.S. economy would not be disrupted unreasonably. After Kyoto, the ball was kicked into China's court. The U.S. had made it clear that bringing key developing countries, including China, on board had been and would continue to be its focus of international climate change negotiations. According to some U.S. Senators, it will be countries like China, India and Mexico that will decide whether the U.S. will ratify the Kyoto Protocol. It is therefore conceivable that the pressure will mount for China to make some kind of commitments at the negotiations subsequent to Buenos Aires. The world's media will undoubtedly bring attention to China's non-participation, which will be seen as holding up the ratification of the Protocol by the U.S. Senate and possibly even be blamed for "blowing up" subsequent negotiations aimed at dealing with developing countries' commitments. The U.S. commitments at Kyoto and diplomatic and public pressure on China had put China in a very uncomfortable position. It looked like China would be Third, developing countries have been sensitive to commitment issues, and the U.S. position at the eight Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in New Delhi makes the launching of a dialogue on broadening future commitments difficult, not to mention to ask developing countries to take on commitments. The U.S. strikingly reversed the position on the commitments of developing countries in New Delhi in comparison with the position at Kyoto. At Kyoto, the U.S. called for stronger action by developing countries, but in New Delhi declared such discussion about developing country's commitments premature. This would have long-term implications because developing countries would defend their position using this argument in the future when being asked to take on commitments. This certainly complicates initiating discussions on joint accession by the U.S. and China.
Fourth, the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol does nothing but erode trust and reinforce the stalemate between the North and the South, and it is difficult to imagine that China and India would assume emissions targets before the U.S. re-entry into Kyoto or a follow-up regime. Doing so would be perceived as rewarding the U.S. for disregarding the Protocol.
Why has China consistently refused in international negotiations even to discuss its participation in a global cap-and-trade regime?
Being the world's most populous country, China is a large greenhouse gas emissions source that grows rapidly in line with its industrialisation and urbanization, and has a great deal of low-cost greenhouse gas abatement options. That explains why many economic studies by Zhang (2000a and 2004) and those examined by Stanford University's Energy Modeling Forum (Weyant, 1999) show that China would reap significant benefits from participating in a global cap-and-trade regime. Even if such a regime is so beneficial to China, why has China consistently refused in international negotiations even to discuss its participation in it? In my view, there are at least five reasons for China's stance.
First and most importantly, participating emissions trading requires countries to take on emissions caps and developing countries including China and India consider it unfair to impose on emissions caps on developing countries in the first place until Annex 1 countries give clear signs that they have taken the lead required in cutting their greenhouse gas emissions. They regard their emissions as survival emissions and those from Annex 1 countries as luxury emissions. Many economic studies (Weyant, 1999; Zhang, 2000a and 2004) Moreover, more than half the G77 are even more vulnerable to climate change than the peers in the Group and thus demand deeper cuts in emissions to prevent dangerous climate change. Given China's desire for the unity of the G77, maintaining a united G77 front would necessitate taking their interests into account. Pushing for stringent commitments by Annex 1 countries is just to that end and appears a better negotiation tactic to pursue than demanding more generous targets for developing countries themselves, in particular given that the current emissions commitments by Annex 1 countries are far short of what developing countries called for at Kyoto and had been relaxed substantially by allowing significant sinks credits in Marrakech Accords. China and India insist that before emissions trading commences, the entitlements of both developed and developing countries have to be defined (Sharma, 1998 (Zhang, 2000a) .
This is only few percentages of the current total FDI in China, which amounted to US$ 52 billion in 2002. FDI has been serving as a powerful engine driving China's economic growth, and is perceived positively both inside and outside China. Binding with FDI would make an inflow of CDM investment in China become less explicit from those who regard CDM as "foreign aid". 6 By contrast, the U.S. has already had huge trade deficit with China, and exporting a large volume of surplus permits from China to the U.S.
would further deteriorate the U.S. trade balance sheet with China. (2002) suggest that massive exports of permits would lead to appreciation of the exporting country's exchange rate and a decline in its exports other than permits. If China's exports of permits to the U.S. would counteract a decline in Fourth, China is concerned about the implications of "lock in" to emissions cap, in particular no rules and principles for setting emissions targets for the commitment periods subsequent to Kyoto. With the EU bubble treating its poorer member countries more leniently 8 and the Russia Federation widely perceived to have been granted generous targets at Kyoto, it is conceivable that industrialized countries will use the same tactics to bribe developing countries, giving them more generous emissions targets to enlist them to assume emissions commitments. No doubt, granting generous targets would be much less unattractive to developing countries than asking more stringent targets. Developing countries can even gain in the short term, provided that their targets are set even above their business-as-usual levels. But once developing countries assume emissions commitments, they are expected to take even more stringent targets over time, which are generally reviewed by developing countries themselves as impeding their economic development prospects. What matters is the balance between this short-term benefits and China's exports of goods and services to the U.S., then the U.S. trade balance sheet with China would not be deteriorated. 8 The 15 member countries of the EU are each listed with an 8% reduction from 1990 levels in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol. In June 1998, the EU Council reached an agreement under which the commitments are redistributed among its member countries under the bubble provision as specified in Article 4 of the Protocol. This will now serve as the basis of EU ratification and the redefined targets will become the "quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments" for each EU member country under the Protocol. Comparing the differentiated targets with the EU common 8% reduction commitments, we can see that the redistribution of the commitments has allocated more assigned amounts to the poor countries, whose emissions are expected to rise fast, than their allowed levels under the Protocol. By permitting a 25-27% increase in emissions to Greece and Portugal, the EU internal burden sharing of its Kyoto commitments among the member countries clearly indicates that poorer countries should be treated more leniently. If Greece and Portugal can have this sort of rise, it would be very difficult for the EU to reject the demand from the really poor, that is, developing countries, for a not unreasonable leeway in emissions.
the perceived long-term costs to developing countries in terms of restrictions to future economic growth. In this regard, rules and principles for setting emissions targets for the commitment periods subsequent to Kyoto would help developing countries to make informed decision on whether to take on commitments. Unless such principles are put in place, developing countries would be reluctant to assume commitments in the first place, even if hardly challenging. encourage developing countries to assume very pessimistic emissions targets when they are asked to take on commitments, thus raising great concern about the danger of generating "tropical hot air".
The path forward
Current international negotiating process is best characterised as pledge-based: countries formulate their national positions and negotiate in their own self-interests, voluntarily making commitments at their sovereign discretion (Baumert and Kete, 2002 reaches a threshold level of ability to pay or responsibility, it would be required to assume emissions limits. Once agreed, such rules would mitigate some concern about the evolution of commitments over time, and would help developing counties to make informed decision on assuming commitments. Moreover, making rules clear also helps to smooth out fluctuations in the price of permits over time. For example, anticipating accession of bigger suppliers in the later period that would reduce the future price of permits, current suppliers of permits would adapt their behaviours by selling more permits now instead of banking them for sales later in order to maximum their gains.
Moreover, in order to better reflect the specific needs and circumstances of developing countries, participation could take different forms. Although current debates on developing country commitments have overwhelmingly focused on emissions caps, other forms of commitments that are more explicitly linked to needs, responsibility and development objectives of developing countries need to be considered to enlist wider participation. In my view, other commitments than emissions caps could be a useful step towards assuming emissions caps, in particular for the majority of developing countries who are still at the low level of development. Even if these countries reach a threshold level of taking on emissions caps, the caps could be initially made non-binding. Clearly, through a series of gradual steps, this approach encourages broad participation and builds the trust and confidence on accepting legally binding emissions targets in the future. This is probably the best way to encourage China and other major developing countries to take on increasing degree of responsibility over time, which eventually leads China and other major developing countries to assume emissions targets.
